الثلاثاء، 7 ديسمبر، 2010

Is the Strategic Balance Changing?

هل يتغير التوازن الإستراتيجي سؤال طرحه الدبلوماسي الأميركي في سوريا تشارلز هونتر في برقيته إلى وزارة الخارجية
نص البرقية كاملا تجدوه على هذا الرابط
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/11/09DAMASCUS804.html
----------------------------------

¶2.  (S/NF) Syria's determined efforts to re-arm Hizballah
during and after the July-August 2006 war between Israel and
Hizballah have consistently grabbed Israeli headlines, most
recently with Israeli Chief of Staff Ashkenazi's November 10
revelation that Hizballah possessed 320-kilometer range
rockets.  Jane's Defense Weekly reported October 28 on
Hizballah's deployment of the first guided surface-to-surface
M600 missile on Lebanese soil, with a range of 250 kilometers
and circular error probability of 500 meters.  Public
estimates put Hizballah's stockpile as high as 40,000 rockets
and missiles, reinforcing assessments by some experts that
this build-up may portend a shift in the military balance
between Israel and its northern nemesis.  Hizballah SecGen
Nasrallah's recent claims of possessing a capability to
"destroy" the IDF may overstate the case for domestic and
regional propaganda purposes, but reporting in other channels
confirms Nasrallah's bragging on November 11 that Hizballah
can sustain fire on Tel Aviv and reach "all of Israel."  This
capability, if fully used, would represent a quantum leap
over the damage and psychological terror Hizballah rockets
caused in northern Israel during the 2006 war.

¶3.  (S/NF)  There is overwhelming evidence that shows Syria
provided not just logistical and other support in moving the
weapons, but was the main source of the weapons.  Syria's
integration of Hizballah into its military doctrine,
moreover, means that Hizballah operatives and facilities
enjoy a growing footprint in Syria.

¶4.  (S/NF) At least two potential consequences flow from
Hizballah's increased capabilities and Syria's role in
creating them:  (1)  If there is another war between
Hizballah and Israel, it will be far deadlier than the 2006
conflict; (2) as in 2006, there would be compelling reasons
for Israel to want to keep Syria out of any future war if
possible, but there might be a countervailing need to hit
Hizballah and perhaps targets in Syria, some of which are
located in populated areas.

ليست هناك تعليقات:

Al-Mayadeeen Feeds